The MIDDLE CLASS: Increasingly Fond Memories of a Grim Past by Mason, David S.
Butler University
Digital Commons @ Butler University
Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS College of Liberal Arts & Sciences
3-21-1997
The MIDDLE CLASS: Increasingly Fond
Memories of a Grim Past
David S. Mason
Butler University, dmason@butler.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts & Sciences at Digital Commons @ Butler University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more
information, please contact fgaede@butler.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mason, David S., "The MIDDLE CLASS: Increasingly Fond Memories of a Grim Past" Transition / (1997): 15-19.
Available at http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers/32
Permission to post this publication in our archive was granted by the 
copyright holder, Transitions Online (www.tol.org). This copy should be 
used for educational and research purposes only. 
 
This article first appeared on Transition (vol 3, no 5). Copyright 
Transitions Online www.tol.org. 
 
DOI: not available 
I 
'?- _, ~r..; ~~~ :'<C'. '~." -' '. ,,' 
! - """m~' ,.vw =.;._ 0 '~ • Ai' p0~d;;·"(1- • 4i~~t~MI.UD.LE_:CLASS,'""--",, '" 
Increasingly Fond Memories 01 aGrim Past 
Despite seemingly successful reforms in many 
post-communist countries, increasing numbers 
of people have been sliding from the middle class 
into poverty. Nostalgia for the late communist era 
is on the rise, and a new study warns that the 
perceived levels of social and economic decline 
surpass the actual ones - wnich could spell 
trouble for the reformers 
By DAVID S. MASON, ANTAL ORKENY, 
al1d SVETLANA SIDORENKO-STEPHENSON 
THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSI­tions in post-communist Europe have been a resounding success in many respects. Democratic processes and institutions have consolidated with 
unexpected speed, and market economies have emerged 
rapidly. Economists point to resumed economic growth 
(after years of stagnation or decline), rapid expansion of 
the private sector, and the ready availability of consumer 
goods. Politicians and political scientists are heartened by 
the growth of multiparty politics, the orderly electoral and 
parliamentary processes, and the emergence of a lively 
free press. 
Amid all those successes - and much to the surprise of 
many Western and local observers - the reformed-commu­
nist parties swept into power in many post-communist coun­
tries in the mid-1990s, while left-wing opposition forces 
began mounting strong challenges to the market-oriented 
refonns in other countlies in the region. The left tum in the 
public mood was, above all, a reflection of a widespread and 
fundamental disaffection with the refonn processes. While a 
small minority was doing very well as a result of the market­
oriented economic reforms, most people were not, and 
alarmingly large proportions of the respective populations 
were falling into absolute poverty (see box, "The Swelling 
Ranks of Poverty"). 
The old communist-era "middle class" has been forced 
to sink or swim in the new competitive environment. Those 
with skills and adaptability have been able to manage, but 
much larger numbers have been forced into unemployment 
and retirement, which often means poverty. 
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From 1991 to 1995, the real incomes of Russia's citizens dropped 
by 40 percent. Some, like this man being arrested for stealing 
cabbage ill a village near Moscow, resorted to petty crime to 
cope with financilll trouble. 
The political implications of the increasing social 
polarization is compounded by the tendency of most peo­
ple to perceive the changes as even worse than they are. 
As a comparison between the 1991 and 1996 International 
Social Justice Project (ISJP) surveys reveals, people 
remember the late communist era and their social posi­
tions then in a much more favorable light now than they 
regarded them at the time. 
PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC DECLINE 
In 1996, the ISJP fielded a survey On justice perceptions 
in six post-communist societies (Russia, Estonia. Bulgaria, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and eastern Gennany), repli­
cating a 13-country survey from 1991 that had also covered 
some Western countries. 1 In both years, the ISJP investiga­
tors conducted face-to-face interviews in each country with 
nationally representative samples of at least 1.000 respon­
dents. The 1996 survey included many of the questions 
posed in 1991, allowing for comparisons over time, but it 
also included a number of questions about the respondents' 
remembered experiences and situations from the earlier 
period. 
The findings of the 1996 survey for Russia, Estonia, 
Hungary, and Bulgaria are already available and reveal a 
generaJ pattern. (Estonia is a somewhat special case; see 
box, "Russians in Estonia Bear the Brunt of Changes.") In 
all four countries, most people feel themselves to be in a 
very difficult economic situation and see the problems pri­
'Results from the 1991 survey are reported in James KJuegel, David Mason. 
and Bernd Wegener, eds., Social Jusrice and Political Change: Public 
Opinion in CapitaliST and Posl-COJnnumist States (Hawthorne, New York: 
AIdine deGruyter, 1995). 
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Completely Complelely Completely 
Dissatisfied Dissatisfied' Dissatisfied Dissatisfied' Dissatisfied Dissatisfied' 
Burgaria 21 44 50 82 7 24 
Estonia 23 50 26 54 6 20 
Hungary 17 42 20 55 2 16 
Russia 21 65 26 65 3 17 
The celegories have b.... complied based on responses given on a seven.polnt scale, ranging lrom "complelely satisfied" 10 "completely dissatisfied." The cal. 
egory "dlssalisfied" includes allihose who picked any of the Ihree "dissallsfied" options. In all lour countries, the "neutral" response lNo. 4 on Ihe scale) was 
quite large, which left lew people in the "satisfied" categories. 
Figure 2: Sell-Perceived Social Standing 
I 
Mean Social Standing 
(l:lowj 10:high) 
Percentage of Gain or Loss 
in Position from 1990 to 1996 
1991 1996 1989-1990 
in Retrospect 
loss Gain 
BUlgaria 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Russia 
3.92 
4.82 
4.24 
4.02 
2.91 
4.44 
3.93 
4.08 
5.03 
5.71 
4.95 
5.06 
75 
56 
61 
50 
4 
15 
8 
18 
The measure of the perceived change in social status lor each respondent was 
calculated by subtracllng the retrospective social position (column 3) from the 
current one (column 2). The Iasl two columns report the perc:enlagea 01 
respondents for whom that figure was negative (column 4) or posilive 
(column 51 within each national sample. 
marily as a result of the economic reforms of the last six or 
seven years. When asked about their household incomes, 
about half of the respondents in Estonia and Hungary and 
two-thirds in Bulgaria and Russia said they had "much less" 
than they need. When people were asked to compare their 
financ~al situations now (mid-1996) with those of 
1989-1991, an overwhelming majority in each country (as 
much as 86 percent in Bulgaria) thought their current situa­
tion was worse. The present situation was defined as "a lot 
worse" by about two-thirds in Bulgaria. a third in Russia, 
and a quarter of the respondents in Estonia and Hungary. 
The negative evaluations were due in part to very real 
economic problems, but it is abundantly clear from the 
ISJP surveys that in aU four countries. people remembered 
the past much more favorably than they evaluated it at the 
time. In both the 1991 and the 1996 surveys, for example, 
people were asked how satisfied they were with their cur­
rent standard of liVing. In 1996, they were asked an addi­
tional question about their standard of living in 
1989- 1991 (the year depended on the country). Figure 1 
shows the relati ve sjzes of the dissatisfied contingents 
within the respective national samples. 
The first thing to note in Figure 1 is the high level of 
dissatisfaction in 1996 - the middle two columns - with 
big majorities in all countries expressing dissatisfaction and 
from one-fifth to one-half of the respondents picking the 
most extreme choice: "complete dissatisfaction." 
Comparing 1991 with 1996, it is apparent that - except 
in Bulgaria, where the change is very large - t11cre have 
been relatively small increases in the sense of dissatisfaction 
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with the standard of living. Nevertheless, the continuing 
high levels of dissatisfaction - even in countries that have 
begun to show a positive economic turnaround, such as 
Estonia and Hungary - must be at least somewhat alarming 
for policy-makers in the region. 
What is most interesting about Figure I, however. are the 
figures in the last two columns: the respondents' 1996 per­
ceptions about how satisfied they were with their standard of 
living in 1989-1991. In Bulgaria, for example, only 7 per­
cent of respondents remembered being completely dissatis­
fied with the standard of living in 1989, whereas in the 1991 
ISJP survey, as many as 21 percent of a similar sample 
expressed such levels of dissatisfaction. There are even larg­
er discrepancies considering the broader measure of dissat­
isfaction ("'dissatisfaction"). In Russia, for ex.ample, only 
17 percent remember being dissatisfied with their standard 
of living in early 1991, whereas 65 percent expressed such 
feelings in the ISJP survey that year. 
That pattern of unrealistically fond memories of the late 
communist era is repeated in virtually all answers to ques­
tions involving retrospective evaluations of personal and 
national economic situations, the political system, and the 
respondent's own social status. It is well established in sur­
vey research that people often do not exhibit very accurate 
recall, and they particularly tend to forget unpleasant events 
or circumstances. It is not the accuracy of memory that is 
relevant here, however, but the perceived disjunction 
between the way things used to be and the way things are 
now. Periods of economic decline are always dangerous for 
political stability, and it is worse when people percei ve the 
decline to be greater than it actually is. 
PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL DECLINE 
The ISJP included two questions about the self-per­
ceived social position of respondents: one about the 
respondents' class position, and the other about their social 
position in society on a JO-point scale. The comparison of 
class self-identification from 1991 to 1996 is difficult for a 
number of reasons: the declining importance of class as an 
ideological construct in post-communist societies (and the 
consequent popular confusion about the nature of class); 
the dramatic changes in the social structure of those soci­
eties accompanying privatization of the economies; and the 
fact that ISJP investigators in some countries changed the 
class response sets in 1996, reflecting the changes in soci­
ety but making comparisons on these questions over a peri­
od of time more difficult. For all those reasons, the 
answers referring to social position are more reliable and 
useful than those on class. 
Nevertheless, some general observations can be made 
about the changing nature of the class system in post-com­
munist societies. There has been a sizable increase in the 
percentage of people who place themselves in the "lower 
class": in Bulgaria, that group increased from 12 percent of 
the sample in 1991 LO 23 percent in 1996, in Russia it rose 
from 4 percent to 15 percent, and in Estonia it went from 
4 percent La 8 percent. Only in Hungary did this number 
decline, from 20 percent to 16 percent, although other stud­
ies from Hungary show an increase in self-placement in the 
lower class in the early 1990s.2 
Both ISJP surveys asked the respondents to place them­
selves on a one-to-IO scale, with 10 indicating high and one 
indicating low social standing. The 1996 survey also asked 
people where they were on the scale in 1989-1991. Figure 
2 shows the mean position for each country for each of 
those three responses and the percentage of people whose 
current position was lower or higher than their retrospective 
position (in the final two columns). In all country samples. 
there is a high correlation between subjective social class 
and subjective social standing, so the latter is a useful sur­
rogate for class. 
On average, people in aU four countries placed them­
selves fairly low on the social ladder, though the averages 
were much lower in countries like Bulgaria, where the eco­
nomic situation was particularly difficult, than in Estonia, 
where it was better. In every country but Russia, there was a 
substantial drop in the average position between 1991 and 
1996. As in Figure I, the perceived decline was much bigger 
than the actual one, since people in 1996 remembered their 
earlier social positions as much higher (column 3) than peo­
ple reported at the time (column I). As is apparent, most peo­
ple experienced a decline in social status, and in most coun­
tries, very few percei ved a gain for themselves. 
Those perceptions of decline can be partly explained by 
the real decrease in living standards, but also by a sense of 
relative deprivation. That is evident from questions that ISJP 
investigators asked about what compensation people feel 
they deserve for their work and what they actually get. In 
Russia, for example, thaL ratio was 2.3 in 1991 (people felt 
they deserved 2.3 times more than they actually earned), but 
by 1996, that ratio had grown to four. The higher visibility of 
social inequalities such as ostentatious wealth and increased 
material aspirations also play an important role when people 
evaluate their social positions. 
In both Russia and Hungary, the biggest changes in per­
ceived socia! status appear at the extremes of the scale, with 
people at the bottom of the status scale experiencing the 
biggest drop in status, and the people at the top of the scale 
perceiving the biggest increases. Consequently, from 1991 to 
1996, people were pulled out of the middle categories both in 
2p. Rober\. "Egyentosegrudat" ("Perceptions of Inequality], in R. Andorka, T. 
Kolosi and G. Vukovich, eds.. Tarsadalmi Riport [Social Repon] 
(Budapest: TARKI. 1994), pp. 324-325. 
A 1994 UNICEF study of the fonner Soviet bloc 
found that the economic changes had "provoked a dete­
rioration of unparalleled proportions in human welfare" 
and a "health crisis" embodied in rising incidences of 
infectious diseases, stress; malnutrition, and alcoholism, 1 
The same study reported that in Poland, the country that 
had experienced the most rapid and successful economic 
turnaround, the percentage of the population living in 
poverty had risen from 25 percent in 1989 to 44 percent 
in 1992. c 
In Russia, the population experienced both a decrease 
in Jiving standards and growing income polarization. 
From 1991 to 1995, real incomes decreased 40 percenL2 
The ratio between the incomes of the wealthiest and 
poorest rose from 4.4 in 1990 to 13 in 1996. Declines in 
Jiving standards and health care led to an unparalleled 
drop in life expectancy for males, from 64 in 1987 to 
57.3 in 1994 - lower than that in the Philippines or 
Indonesia. A January 1995 poll in Russia reported that 
60 percent of those surveyed said they had only enough 
money for food, or not even that much) 
Conditions vary across the region. In Poland, for 
example, most people are better off than the majority in 
Russia. But in virtually every country in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, most people felt their eco­
nomic situation had deteriorated. As late a" 1994, almost 
twice as many people rated the fotmer communist econ­
omy more highly than the new economic system. Of the 
10 post-communist societies included in a 1994 study, 
only in the Czech Republic did more people rate the new 
system better than the 01d.4 Support for the new eco­
nomic system has risen somewhat since 1994 in most 
countries but remains very low in some, including 
Bulgaria and Hungary. 
[Crisis in Mortality. Health and Mltrition, Regional Monitoring
 
Report No.2 (Florence, Italy: UNICEF Imematiooal Cbild
 
Development Cente.r, 1994).
 
2Sotsialnaya sfera Rossii: Statis·ticheskii sbomik [The Social Sphere 
of Russia: Statistical Compendium] (Moscow: Goskomstal. 1996). 
3L.K. Levashov, et at., Kak zhivesh Rossiya? [How Does Russia 
Live?! (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1995). 
4Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "New Democracies Barometer 
Ul: Learning From What h Happen.ing," Studies in Public Policy. 
no. 230 (Glasgow: Urtiversity of Strathclyde, 1994). 
upward and downward directions, causing an increased 
polarization of the social structure and a decline in the size 
of the middle class. In the Russian case, for example, the 
1991 distribution curve of social position resembled a nor­
mal, bell-shaped curve, with the largest number of people in 
the middle categories and smaller numbers at the low and 
high ends. By 1996, the curve looked more like a saddle, 
with the middle positions relatively smaller. A similar phe­
nomenon was at work in Hungary. 
For all four countries, probably the biggest reason for 
decreased living standards, increases in the "lower class," 
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Figure 3: EmPlovmen~ Slalus, 1991 and 1996 
(in percentages) 
RUSSIA'S SHRINKING 'MIDDLE CLASS' 
The Soviet Union, even more than the other communist 
states, had a particularly large "middle class" due to the per­
vasive and extensive nature of the socialized economy. The 
transition to a market economy has had a particularly 
ible skills (such as workers in mining and heavy industry») 
Those people have no prospect of finding new positions and 
are increasingly marginalized. In absolute terms, they are the 
big losers in the transition process. 
In relative terms, however, the middle class has lost even 
more. Between 1990 and 1995, the middle strata in 
Hungarian society suffered a 20 percent decline in real 
income.4 The country's middle class was in pal1 a function 
of the abundance of state-provided jobs, but an even broad­
er and bigger middle stratum emerged in the 1980s, primar­
ily as a result of activities in the shadow economy. Some 
Hungarian authors have come to refer to those groups as 
middle class. albeit without the classic middle-class features 
of autonomy, democratic attachment, and a Weberian work 
ethic.S Furthermore. since the communists forbade private 
ownership of the "means of production," the middle class was 
entirely dependent on either state redistributive mechanisms 
or the shadow economy. So when both of those collapsed after 
1989, many of those people were propelled into poorer social 
strata, although a small number ­ mostly the younger gener­
ation of state bureaucrats and managers ­ were able to capi­
talize on the new processes of marketization and privatization. 
The marketization of the economy and labor relations 
increased the gap between the private and the state sectors. 
The free-market economy and the liberal political system 
eliminated the officialllpper limits on income, and that led to 
further inequalities in income distribution. Moreover, the mid­
dle-class groups that remained employed by the state (for 
instance. in the health and education sectors. which remained 
mostly nonprivatized) experienced the most drastic declines 
in incomes, living standards, and consumption. 
The middle class has experienced substantial downward 
mobility. In practical terms, that meant that many people lost 
their jobs and were either forced into early retirement or com­
pelled to retrain for different jobs and positions. On the psy­
chological level, it led to feelings of insecurity, uncertainty, 
and fear for the future, all of which show up in answers to 
other questions in the ISJP survey. Such feelings have, in tum, 
fostered a strong conservative mentality, fearful of any 
changes or programs that could bring new dangers and chal­
lenges. and a false memory about and nostalgia for the Kadar 
era (the last part of the cOtmnunist period). 
3Zsuzsa Ferge, "A rendszervallas nyertesei es vesztesei" [Winners and 
Losers in the Transition]. in R. Andorka, T. Kolosi, and G. Vukovich, eds., 
Tarsadalmi Ripon [Social Report] (Budapest: TARKI, 1996). pp. 414-443. 
"T. Kolosi and M. Sagi, "Rendszervaltas es tar.;adalrni szerkezet" [Transition 
and Social Stratification] ill R. Andorka, T. Kolosi. and G. Vukovich. eds.. 
Tarsodalmi Riporl [Social Report] (Budapest: TARKl. 1996), pp. J49--197. 
5See Endre Bilecz, "A polgarosodas es dell1okratizalodas zsakutcai a mai 
magyar larsadalomban" [The Dead End of the Process of Upward Mobility 
and Democratization in Contemporary Hungary], in AmI {( Magyar 
[Hungarian Harvest) (Budapest: MTA. 1988). pp. 32-47; and Erzsebet 
Szalai, "Gazdasagi lUechaniszmus es nagyva1Jalali crdek" [Economic 
Reform and Managerial InterestsJ, Kozgozr1ossagi Szemle. vol. 36, no. 1, 
January 1989, pp. 9-39. 
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and decreased social status was a dramatic decline in the 
number of full-time employees. In both 1991 and 1996, very 
few people with full-time jobs considered themselves at the 
bottom of the social ladder or in the lower social class. But 
from 1991 to 1996, there was a startling decline in the propor­
tion of those with full-time jobs in each country, and big jumps 
in the number of retired and unemployed people (see Figure 3). 
In none of the four countries was even half the population 
working full time in 1996, and in Bulgaria and Hungary only 
somewhat more than a third was. It is primarily the increases 
in the number of unemployed and pensioners that are expand­
ing the ranks of the lower social classes in those societies. 
YEARNING FOR THE KADAR ERA 
The change in employment structure is one of the biggest 
differences in the survey samples in Hungary in 1991 and 
1996. The collapse of state socialism and the consequent end 
of the so-called caring employment policy account for the 
sharp rise in the number of unemployed and retirees in the 
ISJP's 1996 sample. The latter phenomenon is not a function 
of increased average age in Hungary (the two samples are 
not significantly different in terms of age) but rather of the 
rapid increase in early retirements as a result of economic 
restructuring and increasing health problems. 
The increase in early retirements has contributed to the 
emergence of a relatively large new stratum of poor ­ peo­
ple whose jobs became redundant and who have no convert­
The 1996 International Social Justice Project sur­
vey found interesting differences along ethnic lines in 
Estonia. Estonians and ethnic Russians have different 
perceptions about current and past social standing and 
economic well-being, as well as differences in employ­
ment status. In 1996, ethnic Russians were somewhat 
more dissatisfied with the standard of living than were 
Estonians. But Estonians were much more likely to 
remember being dissatisfied in 1990 (24 percent) than 
Russians (11 percent). 
Similarly, Estonians rated their current social posi­
tions higher (4.7) than did ethnic Russians (3.95). On 
the other band, ethnic Russians remembered their 1990 
status as higher (5.96) than Estonians (5.54). Thus a 
much larger percentage of ethnic Russians (71 percent) 
perceived a loss in position than Estonians (47 percent). 
Moreover, in 1996, ethnic Russians were significantly 
more likely to be unemployed than Estonians (9.9 per­
cent compared with 4.6 percent) and somewhat less 
likely to be retired or working full time. 
destructive impact on that stratum, a significant part of 
which has shifted into lower economic and social positions. 
As sociologist Tatyana Zaslavaskaya has pointed out. the 
only people who have really benefited from economic and 
social transition are those with "marketable resources," 
including entrepreneurs, service workers, the top layers of 
the intelligentsia, the "workers' elite" (highly qualified and 
skilled workers), and people from law-enforcement agencies. 
On the flip side of that coin, the changing economy and the 
economic crisis have dealt particularly harsh blows to indus­
trial workers, unskilled workers, peasants, and clerical work­
ers. The bulk of the intelligentsia (white-collar and profes­
sional workers), which used to occupy the middle positions of 
the sociaJ structure, has split into two directions: some have 
fallen in status, joining the ranks of the unemployed or 
becoming simple clerical workers; while others have man­
aged to move upward into the ranks of the top intelligentsia, 
for example, by becoming managers and professionals.6 
As in the Hungatian case, the biggest cause of the expan­
sion of the lower class and the contraction of the middle class 
is the increase in unemployment and early retirement, and that 
has particularly affected the older generation. In fact, age is 
the single biggest socioeconomic detemlinant of subjective 
social status in Russia in 1996 (in the 1991 lSJP survey, age 
was not a statisticaJly significant determinant of such status). 
During the Soviet period, higher education guaranteed job 
security and higher status. Today, however, education is a 
much less important determinant of social class. 
6T. I. Zaslavskaya, "Stratifikatsiya sovremCOllogo obschestva" [Stratification 
of Contemporary Russian Society). Economic and Social Change. 171e 
Monitoring of Public Opinion, no. 1 (Moscow: Russian Center for Public 
Opinion Research, 1996), pp. 3-7. 
Intergenerational tension and conflict have historically 
played a big role in the evolution of Russian society, as man­
ifested in the traditional dilemmas of .'fathers and sons."7 The 
current social transformation, however, has made the gener­
ational dimension central. There is an obvious and growing 
gap between the younger and older generations, which did 
not exist in 1991. In 1996, for example, only 6 percent of 
the youngest age group (18-26) considered themselves in 
the lower social class, whereas 32 percent of the oldest 
group (66-75) did. Conversely, 47 percent of the youngest 
age group considered themselves in the middle class, while 
only 12 percent of the oldest group did. Those differences 
are continuous across all age categories and do not just 
reflect the extremes. 
Meager resources render the older generation particlllar­
ly dependent upon the state; at a time when the govern­
ment's financial troubles are jeopardizing the entire welfare 
system. The average retirement pension in today's Russia is 
only 84 percent of the minimum subsistence level, forcing 
a big proportion of the older generation into poverty. The 
generation gap is not just a financial one, but also a social 
and cultural one. Many older people are experiencing a loss 
of social status and respect, which they had hoped and 
expected to secure as a reward in their old age. 
PROGRESS THROUGH INEQUALITY? 
The changes in the post-communist states are not just 
political and economic but social as well, involving funda­
mental changes in the objective and subjective social struc­
tures. Poverty and wealth are increasing at the same time, 
causing increased societal polarization. 
The shifting of the social and class structure is, of 
course, making those societies more like Western ones, 
just as the economic and political transitions are, and that 
may be good news for the efforts of the market-oriented 
governments in these countries. Probably a capitalist 
economy could not coexist with social structures as egali­
tarian as those that prevailed in the communist era. The 
governments of the post-communist states can hope that 
the expansion of poverty and the generalized loss of social 
position are only temporary phenomena. Since it is older 
people who are most affected by these changes, it is only 
a matter of time until they are replaced in the labor force 
by those younger and more adaptable. And as the econo­
my improves - as the reformers hope and expect - the 
governments should be able to afford more substantial 
welfare programs. 
But in the short run, the growing poverty and inequali­
ty, and the widespread sense of social and economic decline 
- in societies that are still generally much more egalitari­
an and statist than those in Western Europe and (especially) 
the United States - are bound to cause problems for the 
reformers, • 
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7B. V. DUbin, "0 pokoJenecheskoll\ mekhanizme sotsialnykh izmenenii" 
[The Generational Mechanism of Social Change), in T. I. Zaslavskaya, ed., 
Kuda idel Rossiya? Allema/ivy obschesrvennogo razviliya II [Whither 
Russia? Alternatives of Societal Development III (Moscow: Aspect Press, 
1995), pp. 237-247. 
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